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 No, You “Stand Up”:  
Why Prosecutors Should Stop Hiding Behind 
Grand Juries 
Ben Trachtenberg* 
ABSTRACT 
This Article argues that prosecutors should not allow grand juries 
to consider indicting defendants whom the prosecutors themselves be-
lieve should not be indicted.  To illustrate the problems with this prac-
tice, this Article uses the example of St. Louis County Prosecutor Rob-
ert P. McCulloch – who encouraged deliberations by the grand jury 
that heard evidence concerning the shooting death of Michael Brown 
in Ferguson, Missouri, despite personally believing that Brown’s kill-
er, police officer Darren Wilson, should not be indicted.  The argu-
ments against allowing grand juries to conduct such needless deliber-
ations include: (1) the exercise wastes the time of citizens forced to 
serve on grand juries; (2) the deliberations might, despite the prosecu-
tor’s wishes, result in indictments contrary to the interests of justice; 
and (3) by “passing the buck” to the grand jury, the prosecutor 
evades accountability for his own decisions. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
As he prepared to present evidence to the St. Louis County grand jury 
that would consider whether to indict Darren Wilson for the shooting death of 
Michael Brown, St. Louis County Prosecutor Robert P. McCulloch criticized 
Missouri Governor Jay Nixon for what McCulloch called “doublespeak” con-
cerning McCulloch’s role.  Nixon had suggested that perhaps McCulloch 
should recuse himself from the Ferguson case but stopped short of using 
emergency powers to remove him.  “Just make a decision,” McCulloch said 
to Nixon, via media interviews.  “Stand up, man up.”1  McCulloch added that 
Nixon’s indecision “undermines everything except the cover that he’s pulled 
over his head.”2 
 
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Missouri School of Law.  I thank Profes-
sor S. David Mitchell and the Missouri Law Review for inviting me to participate in 
the Review’s impressive symposium. 
 1. See Kim Bell, McCulloch: Grand Jury to Get Evidence in Ferguson Case 
Through Mid-October, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Aug. 20, 2014), http://www.
stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/mcculloch-grand-jury-to-get-evidence-in-
ferguson-case-through/article_a2893384-0bcf-51a9-b479-9c7e9496c6a1.html. 
 2. Id.  A critique of using “man up” to mean “take responsibility and do your 
job well” is beyond the scope of this Article.  I will note only that associating compe-
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Ironically, it was McCulloch’s apparent desire for “cover” that eventual-
ly helped to undermine public confidence in the grand jury’s work.  And it 
was his own failure to “stand up” and take responsibility for the decisions of 
his office – instead of hiding behind the anonymous lay persons on the grand 
jury – that deprived Missouri of what the people pay for when they hire a 
prosecutor.  Like some other prosecutors before him in high-profile cases, 
McCulloch abdicated the usual role of the prosecutor, choosing instead to 
delegate his responsibilities to untrained citizens with inadequate guidance. 
This Article will discuss the phenomenon of prosecutors declining to 
recommend action to grand juries in politically sensitive cases.  After describ-
ing the reasons that prosecutors might prefer to receive a decision from un-
guided grand jurors – the primary one being an ability to disclaim responsi-
bility for unpopular decisions, particularly when no indictment is returned – 
the Article will argue that prosecutors should resist the temptation to avoid 
difficult decisions.  If a prosecutor believes no indictment is appropriate, she 
should say so.  Indeed, leaving the grand jury to do what it will without any 
prosecutorial recommendation risks the return of unfounded indictments.  It 
also removes public accountability from one of the most important and sensi-
tive acts of executive discretion.  A prosecutor who shifts responsibility to a 
grand jury need not explain her reasoning with the same care and thorough-
ness as one who makes her own decision about what action – including a 
decision not to seek an indictment – is appropriate under the facts and law. 
II.  PASSING THE BUCK 
In at least a handful of prominent cases, of which the Michael Brown 
shooting is the most famous recent example, prosecutors have evaded their 
usual duty of deciding whether a specific case is worthy of prosecution.  
When a run-of-the-mill case reaches a prosecutor’s office (say, when police 
arrest participants in a bar fight, or a motorist is caught with cocaine, or a 
dead body is found in suspicious circumstances), some lawyer in the office 
decides whether to pursue criminal charges.  Depending on the case and the 
size of the office, top management – including the head prosecutor for the 
jurisdiction – will have more or less direct involvement.  As a formal matter, 
whatever lawyer makes the decision (i.e., whether to prosecute and, if so, 
what crime to charge) generally acts under the authority of the head of the 
office – an elected district attorney, a U.S. Attorney, or some such official. 
Some cases go forward, with the prosecutor’s office obtaining an in-
dictment or bringing charges another way, such as by information.3  Other 
 
tent leadership in government and the legal profession with stereotypical masculinity 
(and, by implication, linking incompetence with femininity) is not without its prob-
lems.  See, e.g., Jane Martinson, Why It’s Not OK To “Man Up,” GUARDIAN (Mar. 5, 
2013), http://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/shortcuts/2013/mar/05/not-ok-to-
man-up (“What would ‘woman up’ or ‘person up’ even mean?”). 
 3. See YALE KAMISAR ET AL., MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 950–51 (13th ed. 
2012). 
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cases end with a decision not to prosecute.  Perhaps the bar fight was insuffi-
ciently serious to justify assault charges.  Maybe the cocaine was found in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment.  The coroner might determine that the 
death was a suicide.  For some crimes in which prosecution is feasible, the 
office may simply have more important priorities.  And in other cases, the 
suspect simply is not guilty, or there is not enough proof to obtain a convic-
tion. 
In nearly all of the scenarios described above, some person at the prose-
cutor’s office (acting on behalf of the chief prosecutor) takes responsibility 
for deciding whether to bring charges.  If charges are filed, the office is as-
serting that probable cause exists, and the office is also announcing its implic-
it policy judgment that a prosecution in this case is a sensible use of public 
resources.4  The charging decision can be contested, whether in the criminal 
court by defense counsel or in the court of public opinion by anyone who 
wishes to criticize the prosecutor’s actions.  And if the office decides not to 
prosecute, then critics of the prosecutor’s decision may complain as much as 
they wish.5 
But sometimes the prosecutor passes the buck.  In some cases, prosecu-
tors have investigated whether criminal charges are appropriate, referred cas-
es to grand juries, and then – after presenting evidence to the grand juries – 
made no recommendation on whether indictments are appropriate.6 
For example, after the July 2014 death of Eric Garner at the hands of po-
lice in Staten Island, New York, a Richmond County grand jury declined to 
indict NYPD Officer Daniel Pantaleo.7  Daniel M. Donovan, the county dis-
trict attorney who oversaw the investigation and the grand jury process, re-
leased a statement afterward in which he claimed that in “New York, the Dis-
trict Attorney does not make opening statements, closing statements or argu-
 
 4. NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS, Standard 4-2.4 52–53 (Nat’l Dist. 
Att’ys Ass’n, 3d ed. 2012), http://www.ndaa.org/pdf/NDAA%20NPS%203rd%20
Ed.%20w%20Revised%20Commentary.pdf. 
 5. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978).  Critics generally 
cannot, however, seek a judicial remedy.  See id.  Outside of very rare exceptions, the 
public at large cannot obtain a court order requiring a prosecutor to bring charges.  
See id.  Courts simply lack authority to demand that executive power be used in this 
way.  Id.  (“In our system, so long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that 
the accused committed an offense defined by statute, the decision whether or not to 
prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury, generally rests entirely 
in his discretion.”). 
 6. Seth Klamann, How a Grand Jury Works, and What the Ferguson Panel Can 
Decide, COLUMBIA MISSOURIAN (Nov. 30, 2014), 
http://www.columbiamissourian.com/news/how-a-grand-jury-works-and-what-the-
ferguson-panel/article_a07f9916-e860-518c-8426-be24d507fa57.html. 
 7. See J. David Goodman & Al Baker, Wave of Protests After Grand Jury 
Doesn’t Indict Officer in Eric Garner Chokehold Case, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/04/nyregion/grand-jury-said-to-bring-no-charges-
in-staten-island-chokehold-death-of-eric-garner.html?_r=0. 
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ments to the grand jury, nor attempt to influence its decision.”8  Although this 
claim cannot be fully literally accurate – the prosecutor attempts “to influ-
ence” the grand jury simply by presenting charges and showing evidence – it 
provides strong evidence that Donovan did not recommend to the Richmond 
County grand jury that it indict, or that it decline to indict, Pantaleo. 
Similarly, despite personally believing that Wilson should not be indict-
ed for any crime,9 McCulloch declined to recommend to the St. Louis County 
grand jury whether it should return an indictment.10 
III.  WHY THE BUCK SHOULD STOP WITH THE PROSECUTOR 
When prosecutors believe that the grand jury should indeed return an 
indictment, a policy in which prosecutors present evidence and then allow 
grand jurors to deliberate without any recommendations about appropriate 
charges might be reasonable.  After all, the very inclusion of a charge for the 
grand jury’s consideration can be seen as an implicit statement that a sensible 
grand juror might well vote in favor of an indictment.  And perhaps the lack 
of an explicit recommendation adds to whatever independence the grand jury 
might possess.11  By contrast, when a prosecutor believes that no indictment 
is appropriate for a certain crime, she should not allow a grand jury to delib-
erate on whether to indict for that offense.  It follows that when a prosecutor 
believes that no indictment of any kind is appropriate for a suspect, the grand 
 
 8. Daniel M. Donovan, Jr., Richmond Cty. Dist. Att’y, Statement Regarding the 
No True Bill in The Matter of the Investigation into the Death of Eric Garner, OFF. 
RICHMOND CTY. DIST. ATT’Y 4 (Dec. 3, 2014), http://rcda.nyc.gov/pdf/press/
2014/ps12032014.pdf. 
 9. McCulloch has said that “it would not have been right” for Wilson to be 
indicted.  See Robert McCulloch, Prosecuting Att’y St. Louis Cty., Address at the 
University of Missouri School of Law (Mar. 31, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=QBP_7UTjy4A (the relevant question and answer occurs from 1:01:40–
1:05:34). 
 10. See Alex Altman, Grand Jury Process Raises Questions About a Ferguson 
Indictment, TIME MAG. (Sept. 18, 2014), http://time.com/3399022/ferguson-michael-
brown-darren-wilson-grand-jury/; Jennifer S. Mann, Legal Experts React to Grand 
Jury Process in Michael Brown Shooting, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Nov. 26, 2014), 
http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/legal-experts-react-to-grand-
jury-process-in-michael-brown/article_6565383d-b856-599e-93f9-
dbabefa4bdb5.html. 
 11. That said, I do not mean to argue that recommendations are not appropriate 
when prosecutors believe indictments should be returned.  Given the immense influ-
ence that a prosecutor has over a grand jury, it seems naïve to pretend that grand ju-
rors (who see evidence selected by the prosecution and receive instructions on the law 
from the prosecution) are truly independent actors in most cases.  Prosecutors might 
as well be explicit about what they want. 
4
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jury should not be asked to consider any charges whatsoever against that per-
son.12 
Why not present the evidence and allow the grand jury to deliberate 
even when the prosecutor believes no charges are appropriate?  The most 
straightforward answer is that once a prosecutor is convinced that no charges 
should be brought, further deliberations not only waste the time of grand ju-
rors (who are being asked to evaluate whether to return an indictment that the 
person in charge of prosecuting the case does not even want) but also risks 
injustice.13  Also important is that while wasting the time of grand jurors, the 
prosecutor concurrently evades accountability for her decision. 
This conclusion – that prosecutors should not allow grand juries to con-
sider indicting defendants whom the prosecutors themselves do not believe 
should be indicted – is supported by multiple sources of guidance for the be-
havior of prosecutors, including American Bar Association (“ABA”) stand-
ards and “National Prosecution Standards” promulgated by the National Dis-
trict Attorneys Association (“NDAA”). 
In the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, the ethical rules published 
by the ABA that serve as the basis of lawyer law in the overwhelming majori-
ty of states, Model Rule 3.8 concerns the “Special Responsibilities of a Pros-
ecutor.”14  The first provision states that the “prosecutor in a criminal case 
shall . . . refrain from prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows is not 
supported by probable cause.”15  Accordingly, when a prosecutor “knows” 
that probable cause does not exist, it would be professional misconduct for 
her to bring charges.  Because a prosecutor would therefore have a duty in 
such cases to immediately seek the dismissal of any indictment a grand jury 
might return,16 it is unfair for the prosecutor to waste the time of citizen grand 
jurors by asking them to consider whether to indict. 
 
 12. There is no problem when a prosecutor presents evidence to a grand jury 
without yet knowing whether an indictment is desired.  Among other reasons, it is 
often the grand jury process itself that informs the prosecutor of what action is appro-
priate.  The grand jury also serves useful investigatory functions and allows prosecu-
tors to obtain sworn testimony and thereby “lock in” the stories of various witnesses. 
 13. Potential sources of injustice include indicting someone despite the absence 
of probable cause, as well as indicting someone when probable cause exists but cir-
cumstances simply make it unfair for a prosecution to proceed. 
 14. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 (2013). 
 15. Id. at 3.8(a).  The Missouri provision is identical.  See MO. SUP. CT. R. 4-
3.8(a). 
 16. Prompt dismissal would not, however, eliminate all harm caused by the in-
dictment.  As then-Attorney General Robert H. Jackson said in his famous speech to 
federal prosecutors, “The prosecutor can order arrests, present cases to the grand jury 
in secret session, and on the basis of his one-sided presentation of the facts, can cause 
the citizen to be indicted and held for trial.  He may dismiss the case before trial, in 
which case the defense never has a chance to be heard.”  Robert H. Jackson, The 
Federal Prosecutor, ROBERT H. JACKSON CTR. (Apr. 1, 1940), https://www.robert
hjackson.org/speech-and-writing/the-federal-prosecutor/. 
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Of course, there are many situations in which a prosecutor might believe 
an indictment is inappropriate that are not covered by this rule.  For example, 
a prosecutor might disfavor an indictment for prudential reasons, despite the 
existence of probable cause.  Or the existence of probable cause might be 
uncertain, meaning the prosecutor cannot be said to “know” that charges 
would not be “supported by probable cause.”  Nonetheless, Model Rule 3.8 
provides a category of cases in which allowing grand jury deliberations 
would not only be bad policy but would also risk violating the ethical rules of 
the legal profession. 
The ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Prosecution Function17 lead to 
the same conclusion.  Pursuant to Standard 3.6(c), “A prosecutor should rec-
ommend that the grand jury not indict if he or she believes the evidence pre-
sented does not warrant an indictment under governing law.”18  The commen-
tary for this provision explains that “the prosecutor’s duty to seek justice ob-
ligates the prosecutor to recommend to the grand jury that it not indict where 
the prosecutor believes the evidence would not warrant the initiation of crim-
inal charges in the absence of a grand jury.”19  Further, Standard 3.9(a) pro-
vides, 
A prosecutor should not institute, or cause to be instituted, or permit 
the continued pendency of criminal charges when the prosecutor 
knows that the charges are not supported by probable cause.  A prose-
cutor should not institute, cause to be instituted, or permit the contin-
ued pendency of criminal charges in the absence of sufficient admissi-
ble evidence to support a conviction.20 
In addition to ABA rules and standards, this conclusion is supported by 
rules written by prosecutors themselves.  The NDAA, of which McCulloch is 
a past president and a member of the board of directors,21 has published “Na-
tional Prosecution Standards.”22  NDAA Standard 4-8.1(d) provides, “To the 
extent permitted by the jurisdiction’s law or rules, a prosecutor appearing 
before a grand jury . . . [s]hould recommend that a grand jury not indict if the 
 
 17. See generally ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION AND 
DEFENSE FUNCTION, Standard 3-3.5–.6 (3d ed. 1993), http://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/aba/publications/criminal_justice_standards/prosecution_defense_
function.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 18. Id. at Standard 3.6(c). 
 19. Id. cmt. 
 20. Id. at Standard 3.9(a). 
 21. See Roster of Officers and Board Members 2014–2015, NAT’L DIST. ATT’YS 
ASS’N, http://www.ndaa.org/pdf/BoD-March-2015.pdf (last visited Oct. 19, 2015). 
 22. See generally NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS (Nat’l Dist. Att’ys Ass’n, 
3d ed. 2012), http://www.ndaa.org/pdf/NDAA%20NPS%203rd%20Ed.%20w%20
Revised%20Commentary.pdf. 
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prosecutor believes that the evidence presented does not warrant an indict-
ment under governing law . . . .”23 
In the case of Darren Wilson’s shooting of Michael Brown, McCulloch 
believed – after all the evidence was presented to the grand jury – that no 
indictment was appropriate.  During the question and answer portion of 
McCulloch’s March 31, 2015 presentation at the University of Missouri 
School of Law, McCulloch was asked, “Do you believe that it would have 
been in the public interest for Darren Wilson to be indicted?”24  McCulloch 
responded, 
No, I don’t think it would have been right based on all the evidence, as 
we know it now or we knew it by the end of the grand jury presenta-
tion.  It would not have been right . . . for them to have returned a true 
bill on that, or for us to have filed a charge.25 
After McCulloch explained that he began the grand jury process before 
all the evidence was available, meaning that the presentation of evidence 
started well before he knew whether an indictment would be appropriate, 
McCulloch was asked a follow-up question: “[A]t the end, after the grand 
jury had seen all the evidence, you presented all the evidence . . . if you be-
lieved at that time that it would not have been appropriate for the grand jury 
to return a true bill . . . why not recommend that to the grand jury?”26 
In response, McCulloch said that prosecutors should not even present 
evidence to a grand jury if they know in advance that no indictment should be 
returned.27  By contrast, after the presentation of evidence occurs, he said it 
would be wrong to terminate the process without grand jury deliberations.28  
“Once it’s submitted to the grand jury, then they’re making the decision,” he 
said.29 
As it happens, the grand jury acted in the way that McCulloch hoped it 
would; it declined to indict Wilson for any crime.30  That result, however, 
 
 23. Id. at Standard 4-8.1(d). 
 24. This question, along with the follow-up question quoted below, was asked by 
the author of this Article.  McCulloch, supra note 9 (quoted portions begin around 
1:01:30). 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id.  The questioner also referenced the ABA and NDAA standards quoted 
above.  See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE 
FUNCTION, Standard 3-3.5; NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS (Nat’l Dist. Att’ys 
Ass’n, 3d ed. 2012), http://www.ndaa.org/pdf/NDAA%20NPS%203rd%20Ed.%20w
%20Revised%20Commentary.pdf. 
 27. McCulloch, supra note 9. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. See Monica Davey & Julie Bosman, Protests Flare After Ferguson Police 
Officer Is Not Indicted, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 24, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014
/11/25/us/ferguson-darren-wilson-shooting-michael-brown-grand-jury.html. 
7
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was by no means certain.  Grand jurors are human beings, and predicting 
human behavior is never an exact science.  Also, the more confident one is 
that a grand jury will not return an indictment, the more confident one is that 
the deliberation process is a waste of the participants’ time.  In other words, 
by allowing the St. Louis County grand jury to consider whether to indict 
Wilson, McCulloch either risked indicting someone for a crime despite his 
own belief that it “would not have been right” to charge him, or he wasted the 
time of twelve Missouri citizens who reported for grand jury service under 
threat of contempt of court and received minimal compensation.31 
Beyond wasting time, the grand jury deliberations shielded McCulloch 
(at least temporarily) from accountability.  McCulloch said during his March 
31, 2015 presentation that at the close of evidence, he did not think the grand 
jury would have been right to indict Wilson.32  By allowing the grand jury to 
deliberate regardless, McCulloch evaded the need to state publicly that he 
personally was deciding not to prosecute Wilson for killing Brown.  Instead, 
he argued that he was simply obeying the will of the grand jury.  As he said 
in his November 24, 2014 press conference: 
It is important to note here and say again that they [the grand jurors] 
are the only people, the only people who have heard and examined 
every witness and every piece of evidence.  They discussed and debat-
ed the evidence among themselves before arriving at their collective 
decision.  After their exhaustive review of the evidence, the grand jury 
deliberated over two days, making their final decision.  They deter-
mined that no probable cause exists to file any charge against Officer 
Wilson and returned a “no true bill” on each of the five indictments.33 
Near the end of the press conference, after being asked whether he was 
avoiding “taking a stand,” he reiterated the primacy of the grand jury. 
Everything was presented.  Everything was given to the grand jury.  It 
was all put in front of them.  And the twelve people made a decision 
 
 31. See MO. REV. STAT. § 494.450 (Cum. Supp. 2013) (“A person who is sum-
moned for jury service and who willfully fails to appear and who has failed to obtain 
a postponement in compliance with section 494.432 or as an excuse pursuant to sec-
tion 494.430, or to respond to the juror qualification form shall be in civil contempt of 
court . . . .”).  The St. Louis County website reports “if you are selected as a juror in a 
particular case, the pay [is] $18.00 per day, plus mileage.”  St. Louis County Jury 
Information, ST. LOUIS CTY., MO., http://stlouisco.com/YourGovernment/County
Departments/StLouisCountyCircuitCourt/JuryInformation/jurypay (last visited Oct. 
19, 2015). 
 32. McCulloch, supra note 9. 
 33. Ferguson, Missouri Grand Jury Decision Announcement, C-SPAN (Nov. 24, 
2014), http://www.c-span.org/video/?322925-1/ferguson-missouri-grand-jury-
decision-announcement (the quoted text starts around 9:00). 
8
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 80, Iss. 4 [2015], Art. 12
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol80/iss4/12
2015] NO, YOU "STAND UP" 1107 
that based upon all that evidence, that as tragic as this is, it was not a 
crime.  Not one where charges should have been filed.34 
Among the most important jobs of a prosecutor is to decide what cases 
merit criminal charges.  Not all offenses can be prosecuted, even when the 
evidence is overwhelming.35  And in some cases, certain segments of the 
public may desire a prosecution that would, if brought, offend the interests of 
justice.36  When a prosecutor is elected, as those in Missouri are, the choice of 
what cases to bring is one of the key factors that a sensible voter might con-
sider when deciding whether an incumbent is worthy of reelection.  When a 
prosecutor allows a grand jury to consider indicting someone whom she her-
self believes should not be indicted, the prosecutor makes an already opaque 
process even more difficult for voters to monitor.  By contrast, a forthright 
statement that a certain case is not one the prosecutor believes merits criminal 
charges – especially if accompanied in high-profile cases by a reasoned ex-
planation – informs the public about how a powerful official is exercising her 
discretion under the law.37 
IV.  RECUSAL IS AN HONORABLE SOLUTION 
If a prosecutor believes that political realities – that is, the desire to win 
reelection – preclude her from offering a straightforward defense of her deci-
sion not to bring charges in a particular case, she is free to recuse herself.  
Indeed, the NDAA recognizes the need for recusal when a prosecutor’s “per-
sonal interests” could compromise her judgment, or even cause a “fair-
minded, objective observer” to decide that the prosecutor’s judgment “may be 
compromised.”38  Pursuant to NDAA Standard 1-3.3, “The prosecutor should 
 
 34. Id. (beginning around 41:30, near the end of the video). 
 35. See Jackson, supra note 16 (“If the Department of Justice were to make even 
a pretense of reaching every probable violation of federal law, ten times its present 
staff would be inadequate.  We know that no local police force can strictly enforce the 
traffic laws, or it would arrest half the driving population on any given morning[.]  
What every prosecutor is practically required to do is to select the cases for prosecu-
tion and to select those in which the offense is the most flagrant, the public harm the 
greatest, and the proof the most certain.”). 
 36. See id. (“In times of fear or hysteria[] political, racial, religious, social, and 
economic groups, often from the best of motives, cry for the scalps of individuals or 
groups because they do not like their views.”). 
 37. For an example of a public statement by a Missouri prosecutor explaining his 
decision not to file charges in a shooting death case, see Letter from Daniel K. 
Knight, Boone Cty. Prosecuting Att’y, to Ken Burton, Chief of Colum. Police Dep’t 
(Oct. 23, 2013), https://www.showmeboone.com/pa/common/pdf/Media-Release-
20131023.pdf (fourteen-page letter released to public summarizing evidence, review-
ing applicable law, and explaining decision not to prosecute). 
 38. NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS, Standard 1-3.3 (Nat’l Dist. Att’ys 
Ass’n, 3d ed. 2012) (emphasis added), http://www.ndaa.org/pdf/NDAA%20NPS%
203rd%20Ed.%20w%20Revised%20Commentary.pdf. 
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excuse himself or herself from any investigation, prosecution, or other matter 
where personal interests of the prosecutor would cause a fair-minded, objec-
tive observer to conclude that the prosecutor’s neutrality, judgment, or ability 
to administer the law in an objective manner may be compromised.”39 
NDAA Standard 1-3.5 explains how one can “excuse himself” when 
necessary: “Where an actual or potential conflict of interest exists that would 
prevent the prosecutor’s office from investigating or prosecuting a criminal 
matter, the prosecutor’s office should appoint, or seek the appointment of a 
‘special prosecutor,’ or refer the matter to the appropriate governmental au-
thority as required by law.”40 
This guidance accords with general principles concerning lawyers’ con-
flicts of interest.  Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.7 includes among 
“concurrent conflicts of interest” a situation in which “there is a significant 
risk that the representation of one or more clients will be materially limited 
by . . . a personal interest of the lawyer.”41  In the case of a prosecutor, the 
client is the public at large, or perhaps the state.  If, as argued above, a dili-
gent prosecutor owes the public a duty to explain her decision not to bring 
charges in a high-profile case, then a prosecutor who fears the electoral con-
sequences of providing a candid explanation may well be “materially lim-
ited.” 
The use of special prosecutors to diffuse allegations of partiality (or to 
respond to actual partiality) is not merely theoretical.  Recent Missouri histo-
ry presents many examples of elected prosecutors seeking the appointment of 
special prosecutors because of actual conflicts or the appearance of a conflict 
that might cause reasonable observers to question someone’s impartiality.  
Cases include the “Maryville rape case,”42 the one-car accident at Addison’s 
restaurant involving Moniteau County Prosecutor Shayne Healea,43 a sodomy 
case involving a friend of the Boone County prosecutor,44 charges against 
Kansas City Councilman Michael Brooks, who was accused of choking a 
 
 39. Id. at Standard 1-3.5. 
 40. Id. 
 41. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a)(2) (2013).  The text of the 
Missouri definition is identical.  See MO. SUP. CT. R. 4-1.7(a)(2). 
 42. See David Zucchino & Matt Pearce, Special Prosecutor Appointed to Inves-
tigate Missouri Rape Case, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/
2013/oct/21/nation/la-na-nn-maryville-prosecutor-20131021. 
 43. See Kouichi Shirayanagi, Missouri Attorney General Names Special Prose-
cutor in Addison’s Crash Case, COLUMBIA MISSOURIAN (Nov. 4, 2014), http://www.
columbiamissourian.com/a/181178/missouri-attorney-general-names-special-
prosecutor-in-addisons-crash-case/. 
 44. See Alan Burdziak, Special Prosecutor to Handle Sodomy Cases, COLUM. 
TRIB. (Nov. 11, 2014), http://www.columbiatribune.com/news/crime/special-
prosecutor-to-handle-sodomy-cases/article_d42ceb60-30f5-5018-bce2-
2d9592a3add3.html. 
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legislative aide,45 and the decision not to bring new charges against Ryan 
Ferguson after the Missouri Court of Appeals set aside his murder convic-
tion,46 among others.47 
Put simply, recusal is an honorable and practical option.  If a prosecutor 
is sufficiently afraid of public wrath that she would hide behind a needless 
grand jury procedure, that is, if she would allow the grand jury to deliberate 
despite her own belief that no indictment should be returned, then another 
prosecutor can and should handle the case. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
When Governor Nixon declined to remove McCulloch from the Wilson 
case in August 2014 but reserved the right to do so later if circumstances 
should require it, McCulloch vigorously objected.48  “The [worst] thing that 
can happen is we get deeply into this and he says he’s taking me off the case.  
Knowing him as well as I do, he doesn’t make a decision until he’s cornered 
and absolutely has to make one,” McCulloch said.49  To avoid uncertainty, 
McCulloch offered Nixon advice.  “Make a decision and make it clear.”50 
That November, when McCulloch’s office finished presenting evidence 
to the St. Louis County grand jury, and McCulloch concluded that no charges 
could rightly be brought against Darren Wilson for killing Michael Brown, 
McCulloch should have taken his own advice.  He should have thanked the 
grand jurors for their service, reiterated their important role in his investiga-
tion, and then sent them home, sparing them two days of needless delibera-
tions.  He then should have stood up and announced his decision to the public 
– whether in writing, at a press conference, or both – instead of hiding behind 
a dozen anonymous citizens. 
 
 
 45. See Lynn Horsley, Platte County Prosecutor Will Consider Assault Case 
Against Councilman Michael Brooks, KAN. CITY STAR (Dec. 18, 2014), 
http://www.kansascity.com/news/government-politics/article4644285.html. 
 46. See Alan Burdziak, Special Prosecutor Named in Ryan Ferguson Case at 
Knight’s Request, COLUMBIA MISSOURIAN (Nov. 9, 2013), http://www.columbia
tribune.com/news/local/special-prosecutor-named-in-ryan-ferguson-case-at-knight-
s/article_1cffe302-48cb-11e3-bd7b-001a4bcf6878.html. 
 47. See, e.g., MacKenzie Elmer, Special prosecutor rules Ellingson death was 
accidental, DES MOINES REG. (Sept. 8, 2014), http://www.desmoinesregister.com/
story/news/crime-and-courts/2014/09/08/brandon-ellingson-missouri-
piercy/15287639/ (concerning coroner’s inquest of the drowning death of Brandon 
Ellingson while in custody of state troopers). 
 48. See Bell, supra note 1 (“That is kind of a meaningless statement in terms of 
resolving this issue . . . .”). 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
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